Hamilton continues in Federalist 33 to discuss the issue of the power of the proposed federal government. As we discussed, there was clearly a concern about too much power being vested in the federal government. In particular, Hamilton here is talking about taxation. First, Hamilton explores the nature of power,
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the MEANS necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and collect taxes?
What are the proper means of executing such a power, but NECESSARY and PROPER laws? 1 (Emphasis in the original)
Key here is to understand that the only federal power that the founders anticipated was legislative. There was no thought given to an imperial executive because of the states’ previous experience with Britain. The founders clearly did not intend to create another king. And while Hamilton was talking specifically about taxes in this paper, “the same process will lead to the same result, in relation to all other powers declared in the Constitution.”
But what if the federal government should overstep its bounds? Hamilton contemplates this and responds that, “If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and prudence justify.” The “creature” of the federal government is under the control of the people. According to Hamilton, they have the power to correct injuries to the Constitution.
Returning to taxation, Hamilton goes on to say that neither the states, nor the federal government, can restrict the others’ ability of the other to collect revenue. More on this in the next paper.
In Federalist 34, Hamilton uses the example of the two concurrent Roman legislative bodies (the Patrician and the Plebeian) that had the ability to annul the acts of each other. But he points out that, “these two legislatures coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human greatness.”
The difference in the proposed constitution is that the states would not be able to annul the acts of the federal government, but also that, “United States will, in all probability, find it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular States would be inclined to resort.” Hamilton anticipates very separate actions from the states and a limited federal government because there are actions that are better left to the states.
And again, if the needs of the federal government change, particularly as a result of the need to defend the union, then the ability to collect taxes sufficient for that role is a necessity. Hamilton compares the kingdom of, “Great Britain, where all the ostentatious apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses..” Whereas he anticipates that the proposed constitution would form a government that would be a model of, “the frugality and economy which in that particular become the modest simplicity of republican government.”
In Federalist 35, Hamilton addresses the possibility of the federal government over taxing citizens. And again, the only taxes that are contemplated at the federal level are tariffs. Here he acknowledges that the consumer pays the taxes to the extent that the market allows the merchant to pass those costs along. But, “when the markets happen to be overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the merchant..” who can be driven out of business by this condition.” Since some states would be more self-sufficient than others, the federal government needs the power of designing taxes in order to keep it as fair as possible.
A new objection is addressed here as well, that the House of Representatives would not be representative enough. Hamilton points out that, “The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary.” This is a key point. Up until this time it was unheard of for lower classes of citizens to be represented in government.
But the proposed House of Representatives would be chosen by all groups of people living in the states. He believes that the “landowner” would likely want to elect representatives that want low land taxes, and that “merchants, and men of the learned professions” would likewise elect people that supported their interests.
A critical point for us to consider today is that the Constitution requires all spending to originate in the House of Representative precisely for the reason Hamilton articulates in Federalist 35. While the Senate is designed to be one step removed from democracy, the House is the most democratic of institutions. It is the people’s money that the new federal government will be spending. Even as the founding fathers had a strenuous distrust of democracy, they acknowledged that in issues of spending, the people needed to have a strong voice.
Next: Federalist 36 and 37 Analysis
To read all of John Parillo’s work on the Federalist Papers, click here.
Footnotes
- Original quotes may be found here: https://federalist-papers.com/federalist-33/. ↩︎
Citation
This piece was originally published at American Free News Network and re-published with their permission.
